Persistent geopolitical tensions and supply chain uncertainty are pushing nations to stake their place orbit and accelerate the pursuit of sovereign space capabilities.
There are approximately 59 government constellations currently in development, representing 3,000 satellites to be built and launched over the next decade, according to Dallas Kasaboski, principal analyst at Analysys Mason.
“Given what we know of the developments of those and the funding that’s already been in place, we would estimate that’s about $100 billion in manufacturing and launch revenue,” Kasaboski said, noting that the number is likely to go up. “Next week, next month, next quarter, there could be another country throwing their hat into the ring and developing a new sovereign system,” he said.
Space as a Strategic Territory
The convergence of space technologies with national security needs and major Earth-based sectors—such as agriculture, logistics and GPS-reliant activities like financial transactions and aviation—has made space a strategic asset for nations, said Alessio Bonucci, associate director for the aerospace and defense practice of Boston Consulting Group.
“From an institutional and defense perspective, satellite communications provide connectivity for key military assets such as sixth-generation fighters, globally deployed ships, and troops—particularly critical in the future of multi-domain operations,” Bonucci said. “Intelligence capabilities, including ISR related to earth observation, add another layer of strategic value.”
In recent months many states, particularly in Europe, have recognized that their lack of strategic orbital resources renders them vulnerable should their fiber connectivity be compromised, said Dr. Melanie Garson, associate professor in international security in the Department of Political Science at University College London, echoing Bonucci.
“Many countries have been late to the game on this as integration of technologies reliant on space infrastructure in civilian as well as military applications has outpaced state investments in protecting this element of their supply chain,” Garson said.
Additionally, an increasing number of nations are recognizing the importance of developing their own space capabilities to reduce reliance on foreign partners and mitigate the risk of geopolitically driven supply chain disruptions, Bonucci said.
Because even longstanding allies are no longer fully reliable, not only major space powers like the U.S., Russia, and China but also an increasing number of mid-tier countries—such as India, Japan, South Korea, various European nations, and Canada - are exploring ways to build their own independent space capabilities, Bonucci said. “This is part of a broader global trend that includes significant commercial elements such as supply chain security and defense capabilities at large.”
Middle powers are boosting their own orbital capabilities to gain status and project influence beyond what they can achieve on Earth, said Garson.
Countries like the UAE are using major space investments to expand their influence, while the newly formed African Space Agency is working to coordinate the continent’s efforts for greater protection and capacity, she said.
Building Resilience Through Independent Access
The central idea behind owning a sovereign space asset is to build resilience into your network, said Alexander Clark, senior analyst at Analysys Mason.
That can mean physically owning your own satellites, but it also extends to ensuring your access remains stable in the face of future disruptions, Clark said. For example, a sovereign satellite can serve as a backup if an alliance partner’s system is attacked, compromised, or suffers a failure. This ensures you stay online, your Earth-observation data keeps flowing and your satcom capabilities remain intact, he said.
Sovereignty and geopolitics do influence how states manage their data, but sovereign capability is less about blocking others and more about ensuring independent access - particularly in commercial and civil cases, said Kasaboski.
Civilian and commercial users in Europe, for example, will continue relying on U.S. or Asian data when it’s available, said Kasaboski. The value of a sovereign system like Iris2 is that it provides assured access if external providers reduce or withdraw data, he said.
Resilience also includes being less dependent on vulnerable supply chains, so you’re not exposed to sudden shocks, said Clark. In Europe, the Ukraine conflict triggered major supply-chain disruptions in the space sector, Clark said. The idea isn’t necessarily to bring all manufacturing within national borders, but rather to avoid over-reliance on any single source and to protect critical capabilities from external shocks.
Using Iris2 as an example, Kasaboski noted that the program initially reflected the view that “Europe should have its own capabilities” and use the project to reinforce the regional space industry. But after the Ukraine conflict, tariff shifts, and supply-chain pressure, that early rationale gained more weight, reinforcing the push to build a more resilient, Europe-based space network.
This need for sovereign European connectivity has grown under the current U.S. administration, with fears that intelligence or even Starlink access could be withheld from Ukraine, said Garson. Europe is exploring stronger local options like Eutelsat, but no single provider can yet match Starlink’s coverage, Garson said. While the Iris2 initiative aims to expand access by pooling resources, coordination challenges and national competition weaken progress, she said.
Europe, Canada Aim for Greater Launch Autonomy
The Ukraine conflict also sparked an increase in urgency for reliable launch access in Europe after losing access to Soyuz rockets, said Clark. This created a significant bottleneck and became one of the key factors behind SpaceX’s accelerated growth, Clark noted. At the same time, with the United States adopting a more inward-looking posture and placing less emphasis on its European NATO partners, the pressure on Europe to develop its own launch capabilities has only intensified, Clark said.
As a result, various European defense agencies have begun seeking out European spaceports they can rely on, Clark said. A recent example is Sweden’s FMV, the procurement authority for the Swedish Armed Forces, which contracted the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) for access to the Esrange Space Center in Kiruna, northern Sweden. This agreement not only supports investment in new infrastructure - including a third launch pad - but also ensures the military can use that launch pad whenever needed, he said. In a crisis scenario - such as a sudden conflict - this setup would allow them to put assets into orbit immediately, with contingencies already planned, he said.
“Canada has also launched an indigenous competition for a Canadian launch capability, so indigenous activities are starting to take place to provide that kind of immediate access to space for defense players to play around in,” Clark said.
Balancing Sovereignty with Smart Alliances
Military assets remain exempt from export tariffs, so the defense sector still has some protection from economic headwinds, said Bonucci. Yet major programs - such as sixth-generation fighters like the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) or large orbital systems like Iris2 - now require multinational cooperation because of their scale and cost, he said.
The challenge is balancing strategic autonomy with choosing the right partners and working with them as equals, Bonucci noted.
“The solution is managed interdependence, not isolation,” he said.
For example, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is promoting the Telesat Lightspeed LEO constellation to Five Eyes partners, with Australia - after canceling its JP 9102 satcom program - alongside the U.K. and Japan as key prospects, said Bonucci. Telesat is already building a ground station in New South Wales, with launches set for late 2026, and is also in discussions with Norway and the U.K, Bonucci said. The aim is to share costs and optimize the constellation's use, he said.
Fragmentation Remains a ‘Critical Risk’ in Defense Sector
While sovereignty has been gaining momentum, Iran’s recent attacks on data infrastructure show the need for more decentralized, resilient systems, which may slow these trends, Garson said. Iran’s coordination with Russia and China in targeting Israel, the GCC, and Europe also highlights the need for stronger cooperative countermeasures, she said.
A level of collaboration and interoperability could prove advantageous - even in sovereign space contexts, said Bonucci. Fragmentation has led to mismatches in total defense spending among nations, but also to a proliferation of assets in orbit serving similar purposes, he said. This is especially true for satcom constellations - if each major European country were to develop multiple constellations, the results would be redundant capabilities and significant fragmentation due to systems potentially not talking to one another.
“Fragmentation is the critical risk - and it is not different from what the defense industry has experienced over the last few years, especially in Europe,” said Bonucci.
Some regions are exploring the idea of having constellations that are interoperable but with different shells that could be segregated and separated - “with some sort of red line between the different shells and orbits,” said Bonucci. However, this has yet to be operationalized, he said.
Europe is beginning to adopt this shared-model approach through GOVSATCOM, which combines satellite capacity from government systems and trusted private operators into one unified service instead of each country building its own, said Bonucci. The EU declared GOVSATCOM operational in January 2026, with eight satellites from five member states now integrated and Cyprus the first nation to use the system, according to Bonucci. Starting in 2029, GOVSATCOM will link with the Iris2 constellation - roughly 290 satellites in MEO and LEO - to deliver full capability, he said.
A similar model could apply to Earth observation, where countries contribute their own assets but access services through a coordinated European framework - preserving national sovereignty while reducing duplication, Bonucci said.
The U.S. military is already approaching the challenge of interoperability in a different way, said Bonucci. The Space Development Agency’s proliferated LEO architecture is built so that, as industry leaders put it, ‘the bullet costs more than the satellite.’ By keeping individual satellites inexpensive and deploying them in large numbers, the system gains resilience through sheer volume rather than by hardening a few high-value assets, he said, adding that Europe needs to adopt this mindset collectively.
“The space lesson is clear: if you do not design infrastructure to be interoperable and compatible from the beginning, you risk wasting investments.”
Challenges and Opportunities for Commercial Space Firms
Alongside navigating these structural and coordination challenges, governments are also rethinking their relationship with the commercial space sector. Agencies face a choice when they need satellite data: they can simply buy commercial imagery from companies like Planet or Iceye, or they can decide to own a satellite outright for more control, said Kasaboski. In some cases, a government wants a sovereign asset but doesn’t have the resources to run it, so they outsource the operations, Kasaboski said. “It’s still a sovereign satellite, but it’s operated by somebody else as long as that passes whatever security checks you have,” he said.
The Iran conflict exposed vulnerabilities in private satellite constellations like Planet, whose services had to be delayed in order to avoid revealing sensitive information, Garson noted. “This is currently ad hoc but points to the need for clear communications mechanisms between defense agencies and private sector satellite providers for emergency measures,” she said.
Agencies are also shifting their priorities, said Kasaboski. In the past, governments and militaries typically worked only with top-tier commercial providers because those companies were the ones capable of meeting strict requirements. But in recent years, government agencies have sought after cheaper, faster and more varied capabilities, which has pushed them to broaden the range of companies they engage with, Kasaboski said. As a result, agencies are diversifying their vendor base more than before while continuing to keep in mind sovereign concerns, he said.
“Governments seem to have a stronger appetite, but sometimes that also means that they want to control things themselves,” Kasaboski continued. “And depending on that definition, it can be an opportunity or a challenge for a commercial vendor.”
Rather than representing a vulnerability, a commercial market contraction could actually be an opportunity from a defense perspective, said Bonucci. If providers like SES or Viasat see shrinking commercial markets, they will naturally rely more on government contracts - and therefore care even more about those customers. This actually strengthens government leverage, he said.
“The real vulnerability lies not in market dynamics but in capability mismatch,” Bonucci said. “When defense missions rely on dual-use commercial assets that are not at military-grade levels of security, that is where critical challenges present themselves.”
One example of this is the Russian cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite in February 2022, Bonucci noted. The attack used a wiper malware known as AcidRain, which disabled thousands of modems across Europe, Bonucci said. It disrupted remote monitoring and control for 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in central Europe, representing 11 GW of capacity, and impacted around 30,000 satellite terminals across various industries, he said.
“This illustrates the systemic risk when civilian infrastructure relies on commercial systems without adequate hardening,” he said.
“At the same time, it is important that governments - especially large ones such as the U.S. - maintain viable industrial diversity. Putting all eggs in one basket, such as with SpaceX, creates its own risks,” Bonucci continued. “The Starlink experience in Ukraine demonstrated both the extraordinary value and the inherent risk of single-provider dependence - particularly when a CEO’s decisions can affect the operational capabilities of an allied military. Governments need multiple strong partners to preserve optionality and resilience.”
Rising Investment Signals Space-Focused Defense
Eventually, national satellite constellations will become core elements of a country’s defense infrastructure, on par with fighter jets, naval vessels, radar and other strategic systems, Bonucci said.
“In all instances this will impact strategic capability, economic security and consequently human security, said Garson. “Balance of power will be determined by access to these supporting capabilities as well as resilience to be operational without it.”
Consequentially, there will be a shift in how priorities are set, said Bonucci. European countries have historically spent under one percent of defense budgets on space, but that is rapidly shifting, he noted. Germany, for example, met NATO’s two percent defense-spending goal in 2024 and committed to a five percent target in 2025. The country also plans to double its defense budget within five years, with space now seen as central to national resilience, he said.
Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to lead with substantial, clearly defined investments - starting with the Golden Dome program, which has at least $185 billion already allocated, said Bonucci.
Military institutions are increasingly prioritizing local development, backing national champions—even in emerging, non-G20 countries—to build up their own industrial capabilities over time, according to Bonucci.
“In this context, when defense agencies land significant contracts with established players—such as Airbus or Iceye—they seek to negotiate offsets and technology transfer arrangements,” Bonucci said. “The objective is to build local capabilities so that, over time, these countries can grow their level of independence and security.”
The industrial landscape is shifting in response. SES, for instance, secured 690 million euros in new contracts in the first half of 2025 and now has a 4.2 billion euros billion backlog, reflecting how established operators are benefiting from rising European defense investment, Bonucci said. Luxembourg and SES are also moving ahead with GovSat-2, a dedicated defense satellite built by Thales Alenia Space to deliver highly secure connectivity for NATO, EU, and national missions, he said.
The broader strategy is long-term: each contract helps strengthen domestic industrial capability, reduce future dependency and bolster resilience against supply-chain or geopolitical pressures, he said.
“It is not about rejecting established primes, but about structuring deals to gradually shift the capability baseline toward self-sufficiency,” Bonucci said.
Protecting the New Tactical Domain
As constellations continue to scale into the tens of thousands, it becomes paramount for nations to understand how those assets can be protected, but that can be a challenge for even countries already established in space, said Bonucci.
“We are talking about cutting-edge technologies and solutions where higher levels of unknown create even larger uncertainties. This is where it becomes critical for countries to first understand what they want to do, why it is relevant for them and how they should go about it,” Bonucci said.
By early 2025, more than 10,000 satellites were actively operating in low Earth orbit, and forecasts indicate that an additional 20,000 to 58,000 could be launched by 2030 - while global government space investment is also on the incline, he said.
But many countries still haven’t fully planned for protecting space systems from cyber or physical attacks, warned Garson. Vulnerabilities across the space communications supply chain - from outdated systems at risk from quantum threats to cyber-physical ground stations - and planning for disruptions, whether malicious or from space weather, remain largely underestimated, she said.
The next step is for nations to address how to defend and secure their assets in space - whether orbital slots, frequencies or the physical infrastructure itself, Bonucci said.
“The power shift in space mirrors territorial competition on Earth,” he said. “Nations will treat orbits as a strategic domain, alliances will realign around space capability, and the deterrence calculus will be rewritten. We are seeing geopolitical expansion logic applied vertically - into orbit.”
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