Repeated GEO Proximity Ops Expose Limits of Assumed Stability

A communications satellite with solar panels and a dish antenna orbiting Earth in geostationary space.

Close-proximity operations in geostationary orbit are poised to become a routine feature of the orbital landscape, demanding new approaches to monitoring and satellite management.

Notably, the repeated close-range maneuvers of Russian satellites associated with the Luch-1 and Luch-2 during the past decade are no longer viewed as anomalies in orbit by European defense organizations, but as deliberate activities intended for interference or espionage, said Lionel Biree, aerospace research engineer and associate researcher at the Paris Observatory and SSA specialist at space consultancy Elios-Space.

NATO on Feb. 4 reported that more than a dozen European communications satellites were approached by Luch-1 and Luch-2 over the past three years since the Russian payloads were launched in 2014 and 2023 respectively. In addition to concerns of data interception, European authorities reported concerns of the Luch-1 and Luch-2 disrupting the European satellites’ orbits and inducing collisions.

While GEO proximity events impacting European satellites have been taking place for more than a decade, they’ve garnered renewed attention in recent years, prompting nations like France to develop counter space systems to protect their assets from maneuvers by Luch satellites. said Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and retired U.S. Air Force Reserves Captain.

Tailing and Targeted Proximity in Orbit

Both Luch-1 and Luch-2 have shown behavior signatures “consistent with on-orbit signal collection,” repeatedly maneuvering to get close to geostationary communications satellites so they can “cozy up to” those spacecraft and collect the uplink signals targeted at them, said Hugh White, VP, SDA & space superiority at Kratos. There is also evidence that Luch-type satellites could be used in an electronic support and electronic attack role by identifying which signals are aimed at a given satellite and then acting as a “spotter” for ground-based jammers, White added. Luch-1 recently moved into graveyard orbit and then appeared to collide with another object and “basically blew up into a lot of pieces,” prompting further analysis of its end-of-life behavior, he said.

“There’s been an increased need to monitor the activity going on in the geobelt to safeguard against accidental collisions,” said AEI’s Harrison. “It just complicates mission planning for the satellite to do routine things like station keeping and orbit correction maneuvers. You now have to factor in that there is this other uncoordinated object near you, and so you’ve got to make sure that you don’t maneuver into it when you’re just trying to correct your orbit.”

While Luch-1 and Luch-2 are believed to be collecting uplink signals, satellites that shadow others over time are also drawing attention, said White. “We’re also seeing satellites essentially tailing other satellites. And if you think of it like an aerial dogfight, you know they’re basically a bandit who has a blue satellite in their crosshairs,” he said.

For example, the Russian satellite Kosmos 2558 is believed to be an “inspection satellite” after being launched into the orbital plane of a U.S. reconnaissance satellite USA-326 in 2022. Kosmos 2558 in June of 2025 deployed a smaller satellite believed to be an anti-satellite weapon with the goal of maneuvering to get within 81 kilometers of the U.S. satellite.

A new satellite—Kosmos-2589—was also launched June 2025 that is gradually shifting into a circular geostationary orbit, and its purpose there is still unclear, said Bart Hendrickx, a longtime observer of the Russian space program. It might turn out to be similar to the U.S. GSSAP spacecraft, which conduct close-up imaging of GEO satellites, but it’s too early to make a definitive assessment, Hendrickx said.

However, the flybys of U.S. reconnaissance satellites seem mainly intended to gather intelligence, particularly to better understand how those satellites are built and how they operate, he said.

From Tracking to Threat Assessment

The increased frequency of GEO proximity events is reshaping the conversation around space analysis and SSA, influencing the market at multiple levels, said Biree.

“[GEO proximity events] have made it clear that countries need to do more to protect the communication links to and from their satellites,” said Harrison. “Whereas previously, you could assume that no one is going to get this close to get directly in the beam to intercept certain communications.”

With these occurrences no longer regarded as isolated events, but rather as intentional and recurring actions, heightened concerns among operators and public authorities about system security, service continuity and strategic vulnerability are strengthening the case for targeted advancement and advanced surveillance capabilities, Biree said.

“At present, the market extends far beyond simple orbital tracking, with demand shifting toward more sophisticated services that include behavioral analysis of satellites, high-precision characterization of proximity maneuvers and assessment of threat levels as well as their potential operational impacts,” Biree said. “This trend is driving the rise of multisource, contextualized, near-real-time analytical solutions that provide operators with a more comprehensive and reliable picture of the orbital domain.”

In practice, that kind of analysis hinges on knowing how each spacecraft usually behaves, so that any deviation stands out quickly, said White. A spacecraft that routinely performs small station-keeping maneuvers on a predictable schedule may attract little attention, but a satellite that rarely maneuvers and suddenly executes a large burn to move closer to another object is much more likely to be treated as a potential concern, said White. “If a satellite that historically hasn’t showed that pattern of life starts to make a hard burn, then that becomes more interesting,” he said.

The New Baseline for GEO SSA Performance

As requirements diverge across commercial, institutional and defense stakeholders, the market is becoming more segmented, clarifying the positioning of companies specializing in advanced SSA, strategic analysis and decision support, said Biree.

SSA is also becoming increasingly embedded within resilience and risk-mitigation strategies, adding to the competitive edge for operators with SSA capabilities, Biree said.

“Proximity events now fuel discussions with insurers and public decision-makers, and the ability to demonstrate active monitoring and robust analysis is becoming both an economic and strategic argument, thereby strengthening demand for SSA services fully embedded within operational workflows,” he said.

As SSA becomes woven into day-to-day decision-making, expectations for what commercial providers deliver are changing in parallel, said White.

The earlier model in which customers would call an SDA provider like Kratos before a planned close approach and ask for “additional custody” around that event has given way to an expectation of persistent monitoring, according to White.

“In the past, RPOs were fairly rare, and they were highly coordinated,” said White. “Now it’s essentially a requirement that all owner operators have pretty persistent coverage, not just on where their satellite is, but on any other satellites that might come close, because an RPO or a close approach can happen with virtually no warning and potentially catastrophic consequences,” he said.

Implications for Future Fleet and Ground Design

GEO proximity events have increased the focus on securing data and communication links across the infrastructure, Harrison said. That means protecting command and control systems, adding redundancy and improving how signals are encoded with passive safeguards.

These changes often have practical implications on infrastructure, necessitating upgrades to equipment on satellites or in ground facilities, Harrison said.

Persistent GEO proximity events act as a powerful accelerator in favor of virtualized and software-defined ground architectures because these events highlight the growing need for resilience and adaptability in ground infrastructure, Biree said.

“Software-defined ground architectures offer the ability to dynamically adjust operating modes, switch between ground stations, redefine mission priorities and adapt telecommand and telemetry schemes without relying on fixed hardware infrastructures,” Biree said. “This operational agility is critical for responding to unexpected or evolving proximity events.”

Additionally, decoupling critical satellite functions from physical hardware enables operators to flexibly distribute or move ground-based satellite capabilities, mitigating the impact of jamming and outages, he said.

Adaptability is paramount as the nation’s critical infrastructure increasingly depends on space-based systems to function reliably, said Steve Casapulla, executive assistant director for infrastructure security and interim assistant director for the National Risk Management Center at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

Organizations that design, operate, or rely on these systems are being urged to take a hard look at their exposure to cyber threats and to strengthen their basic cyber practices. That includes applying risk-informed cybersecurity measures across every layer of the enterprise—from ground infrastructure and communication links to the satellites themselves, Casapulla said. Emerging approaches such as virtualized ground stations can further enhance the protection of space systems and the services they enable, he said.

But using virtual ground networks means operators must inspect and verify equipment and software updates to ensure they’ve been configured correctly, said Harrison, noting that this is especially true when relying on a third party’s network.

Consequently, GEO proximity events are reinforcing the need to treat space domain awareness, cybersecurity and ground operations as closely linked parts of the same resilience picture, Biree said.

“The rise of virtualized architectures necessitates a comprehensive security approach in which cyber-intrusion protection, access management and space domain monitoring become tightly interconnected,” he said. “As a result, proximity operations in geostationary orbit are shaping long-term trends toward more modular, scalable and resilient ground systems, suited for a now-contested space environment.”

Evolving GEO Ops for a Higher-Risk Era

Operators are also increasingly incorporating advanced SSA tools, multi-source data fusion and AI-driven behavior analysis into their day-to-day operations, Biree said. These capabilities allow them to refine alert thresholds, anomaly-detection methods and response procedures in near real-time as conditions in orbit evolve, he said.

AI in GEO monitoring is used to ask specific questions of the data, such as whether a satellite typically maneuvers at a certain time, which objects have deviated from their usual pattern of life, or which sensor readings look anomalous and might indicate a sensor failure, said White. “AI is really good at sorting through large amounts of data and helping to establish Patterns of Life,” he said. But determining the right course of action in response to a close approach is where operators still need to be cautious about relying on AI, he noted.

As the strategic stakes rise, technological development will continue to push forward, Biree said.

“In short, geopolitical tensions manifest not only through more assertive orbital behaviors but also act as a catalyst for technological, doctrinal and normative innovation, reshaping the long-term exploitation of space,” he said.

That shift is forcing operators to think differently about how they control satellites in a more dynamic and contested GEO environment, said White.

As proximity maneuvers become more common and the broader space environment more contested, operators are also being pushed to rethink how much passive risk they can tolerate on orbit, White said. “I think the days when assets in space can be completely unprotected, and then that doesn’t become a risk for the customers of that satellite, I think those days are over,” he said.