Britain Wants More from Space. Can It Build It?

Britain has spent years building a space sector that punches above the kingdom’s weight without necessarily building the national capabilities to match it.

Now, the UK government wants to change that.

Its new UK Space Strategy, released Sept. 8, puts defense and national security alongside economic growth at the center of space policy, backed by more than £7.8 billion ($10.5 billion) through 2030. The strategy calls for stronger national capabilities in key areas and increased collaboration with NATO, the U.S., ESA and commercial industry.

It is a considerably more assertive approach than simply participating in international programs and allowing a strong commercial sector to develop around them.

But building the capabilities behind that ambition may prove more difficult than setting the priorities.

Post‑Brexit Pressures Expose Structural Gaps

The new space strategy and investment mark a major shift, signaling its intent to bolster its position in space, Dr. Melanie Garson, associate professor in international security in the Department of Political Science at University College London, told Constellations.

Although the UK is established in the sector, it remains far smaller than major commercial and national constellations and risks falling behind as countries like India expand rapidly. For example, Jio Reliance plans to deploy a 1,600‑satellite constellation, she said.

The new strategy helps close some gaps and offers clearer direction in priority sectors, but it still lacks a broader vision of the kind of space power the UK aims to become, Garson said. Its focus is largely on satellites, industry sustainment, partnerships and alliance integration, while exploration and lunar‑related areas have been downplayed – an approach that may limit the UK over time, she said. To stay competitive, the government needs to consider other nations’ trajectories and define where it wants to sit within that landscape, strengthening the technologies that make the UK indispensable in partner supply chains. It also needs agile cross‑agency and MoD teams capable of adjusting as ambitions evolve, she said.

Gabriel Elefteriu, founding partner at London-based space advisory firm AstroAnalytica and a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, has long argued that Britain’s dependence on partners for critical space capabilities leaves it with less room to maneuver as the strategic environment changes.

“Britain finds itself in a very vulnerable strategic position.” — Gabriel Elefteriu, AstroAnalytica

“It has hardly any sovereign space capability in orbit, apart from Skynet; it spends comparatively very little – in relation to peer nations – on space; it has no Launch capability; it has no independent civil space programme development capacity for end-to-end missions (it has outsourced its civil space programme to ESA); and it is now faced with crushing industrial competition from the new European wave of space investment, which will affect UK industrial competitiveness,” he continued.

The nature of the UK’s “special relationship” with the U.S. has also made the former late to the space defense party, Chris Lee, space sector strategic advisor at AstroSpace Solutions and former chief scientist at the UK Space Agency, told Constellations. This arrangement has given the UK advantages, such as shared costs and contributions like intelligence, but it has also left British industry at a disadvantage compared with its European peers, who had to fend for themselves, Lee said.

The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union on January 31, 2020, contributed to this vulnerability, Elefteriu said.

“This is one of the few areas where Brexit was objectively a significant loss,” Elefteriu said. “Brexit seriously hindered UK space posture in the civil domain and in terms of industrial competitiveness.”

Elefteriu noted that the UK had been deeply integrated into EU space programs and European supply chains before Brexit, which made the split particularly costly.

Brexit has also undermined Britain’s ability to engage with the European space ecosystem as fully as before, making harder to compete in areas that are still extremely costly and complex – from satellite manufacturing to autonomous access to space, Dr. Raúl González Muñoz, Peace and Security Strand Lead at the Leverhulme Centre for Humanity and Space and lecturer in Space Policy and Economy at the University of Leicester, told Constellations.

There were arguably major military implications from the UK leaving the Galileo program, particularly the PRS service, Elefteriu said. The UK had been heavily involved, holding contracts for the highly sensitive cryptographic components of the PRS signal – the system’s “brains,” he said. Losing access to Galileo PRS therefore weakens the UK’s overall resilience. Alternatives like eLoran are too imprecise and usable only within the British Isles, making them no replacement for a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) like Galileo, González Muñoz added.

Still, because Britain retains access to the GPS M‑Code, the extent to which its day‑to‑day military posture was actually affected is open to debate, Elefteriu said.

Furthermore, in Europe’s new launcher competition managed by the European Space Agency (ESA), named European Launcher Challenge, the British contender Orbex has already gone bankrupt, leaving the other 4 European startups (ISAR aerospace, RFA, PLD space and Maiaspace) to carry the field, said González Muñoz, who is also Associate Fellow on the Geopolitics of Outer Space at the Academy of International Affairs NRW and European Delegate of the Spanish Association for Aeronautical and Space Law AEDAE.

Overall, the UK appears less likely to thrive outside Europe’s space ecosystem, where collective efforts create a larger impact than any state could achieve alone, González Muñoz. Existing participation in European programs such as Copernicus shows continued alignment, and renewed UK-EU cooperation – potentially through niche specialization – appears both likely and necessary, he said.

“I think that the UK should re engage with Europe sooner rather than later and there are already moves that started with a previous Labour government and that are still ongoing with the current one, that point towards this.” — Dr. Raúl González Muñoz, University of Leicester

Brexit is definitely a hindrance on Britain’s space sector, echoed Lee. It blocks UK industry and academia from key EU programs it once championed, limits growth in the upstream sector and comes at a time when export markets are still small and GEO satellites are becoming less prevalent, Lee said. Yet the EU’s emphasis on practical, citizen‑facing applications rather than grand exploration efforts partly offsets this. “The EU is not putting exploration at the top of its technology shopping list,” he said, reflecting its focus on measurable returns and autonomy.

Despite its political separation from the EU, Britain has historically relied heavily on allies for space support. Its military relationship with the U.S. and civilian relationship with ESA has allowed it to participate in major space capabilities without maintaining a fully sovereign national program, Elefteriu said.

This model is becoming harder to sustain as space capabilities become increasingly central to military operations and national resilience, he said.

The question is how far the UK is prepared to go in building what it now says it needs.

Britain Is Changing What It Expects from Space

The government’s strategy starts from a recognition that space has become critical infrastructure rather than simply an enabling technology.

“Space is not the future – it is the infrastructure of the present.” — UK Space Strategy

Satellite services support an estimated 18% of UK GDP, according to the document, while space capabilities underpin everything from financial markets and navigation to emergency response and military operations. At the same time, the government points to a more contested orbital environment, faster technological change and the rapid expansion of commercial space.

Its answer is a more selective approach to national capability.

Rather than attempting to build a complete British equivalent of the major space programs maintained by the U.S. or other large powers, the strategy identifies areas where the UK can build capabilities that matter directly to national security or where it has a credible industry advantage.

Four subsectors receive particular priority: satellite communications, SDA, in-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing and access to space. The strategy also calls for sovereign PNT infrastructure over the next decade and stronger access to Earth observation data and infrastructure for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

That is an important shift in emphasis.

Defense space should be the most urgent priority – particularly missile warning and tracking, ISR and counterspace capabilities – and in that order, Elefteriu argued,

The immediate concern is what happens if British forces enter a conflict in which an adversary can use space-based systems to track and target them while Britain has few comparable capabilities of its own, he said.

The assumption that allies will provide the necessary support may hold. But it is still an assumption – and one that stresses the importance of having resilient, nationally-owned systems.

“If allies cannot or will not assist, Britain would be completely exposed space-wise,” Elefteriu said.

For Garson, resilience means ensuring a country can maintain core functions in the event of a disruption. “David Koh, former head of Singapore Cyber Authority once described it as the difference between an elevator or escalator – if it stops are you stuck or can you keep moving albeit more slowly,” she recalled.

A digital economy like Britain’s requires people and systems able to operate even when technology falters. The strategy’s focus on strengthening and integrating PNT is an important step toward that, Garson said.

Balancing Strategic Partnerships with Sovereign Requirements

That does not mean the UK needs to duplicate every allied capability. The new strategy is explicit about working through NATO and other partnerships and describes international cooperation as central to how Britain will operate in space.

“International partnerships amplify our power in space – achieving through collaboration what no single nation can deliver alone,” the strategy document states.

The strategy also describes ESA as a core multilateral platform while stating that the UK will use national or bilateral mechanisms where those better serve British objectives.

To enhance its long-term space posture, the UK could “forge a pragmatic middle path” between EU and US approaches by expanding NATO‑aligned space capabilities, Lee said.

“The UK stands at a strategic crossroads between the US and the EU, where independent unilateral action across the security spectrum is simply not possible anymore.” — Chris Lee, AstroSpace Solutions

“The only realistic pathway is to promote space strategy more assertively within NATO,” Lee said.

A strong defense-space agenda would help reset the UK space landscape and support commercial growth. Rather than pursuing ambitious lunar or Mars projects, the UK would benefit from focusing on building essential capacity across both its space industry and government users, he said.

That approach is broadly compatible with Elefteriu’s view that interoperability and partnerships will remain essential. NATO, he argued, can provide an important framework for connecting national systems, but underlying capabilities will still need to be owned and developed nationally.

“The building blocks remain nationally owned sovereign space systems,” he said.

This distinction becomes especially important in areas such as space control. The strategy’s decision to define “Control of Space” as the ability for Britain and its allies to maintain freedom of action in, from and through space – while denying adversaries those same freedoms and protecting national interests – reflects a clear shift in emphasis toward more active space security.

Turning that language into operational capability is the harder part.

Britain’s impact could depend on choosing its most scalable, high value niche, said Garson.

“The UK should decide what it is in the ecosystem that it can build and scale fastest that its partners and allies need so that it is an integral part of the architecture.” — Dr. Melanie Garson, University College London

For example, if that niche is spaceport development, it could become a key NATO asset, with the UK focusing on strengths and leaning on allies where progress would otherwise slow, she said.

The UK already has some notable strengths, including resilient national communications satellites and strong ground segment cyber capabilities, Lee said. It also benefits from a capable SME base in areas like optical communications, quantum tech, on‑orbit propulsion and emerging servicing concepts, he said. By contrast, UK capacity in space surveillance remains limited – despite promise in thermal IR and hyperspectral sensing – and it does not currently supply launchers, he said.

The Commercial Sector Is Part of the Answer

The UK does possess something many countries would like to have: a large, commercially oriented space industry.

The new strategy estimates that more than 1,900 organizations comprise the UK space sector, employing more than 55,000 people, and states that Britain captures approximately 5% of the global space market despite accounting for roughly 1% of global public civil and defense space spending.

The government’s challenge now is to turn that industrial base into greater scale.

The strategy calls for fewer, higher-value grants, greater use of government procurement and potentially using government as an “anchor customer” for companies developing capabilities the state actually needs. It also acknowledges that many UK companies struggle to move from promising technology to sustained commercial growth.

That creates a potential middle ground between government-owned systems and complete reliance on foreign capabilities.

Elefteriu proposed a more formal version of that model: a British private space reserve based on the U.S. Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve concept, in which commercial capabilities are pre-integrated so they can be activated rapidly during a crisis.

“Commercial will have a foundational role UK space resilience as requirements outstrip the State’s capacity to meet them through sovereign means,” he said. “There is already significant private input into UK space operations, especially on SDA.”

The new strategy does not go as far as adopting that specific reserve model. But its emphasis on commercial procurement, domestic supply chains and government as a potential anchor customer points toward a similar principle: Britain does not have to own every piece of the architecture to have meaningful control over the capabilities it depends on.

That may be particularly important as the government pursues a more ambitious approach without the spending levels of the world’s largest space powers.

The Government’s Role Is Still a Question

The strategy also brings the question of government capacity into sharper focus.

Britain’s historic reliance on ESA for much of its civil space activity while maintaining a relatively small national program has limited the expertise available inside government to develop and manage complex missions, Elefteriu said.

“I actually think the key lies in the civil side of UK space policy,” he said.

Britain needs a CNES‑style space agency with its own Space Centre capable of designing, building, and operating full national missions, Elefteriu proposed.

That would represent a significant change from the UK’s existing model, but the strategy is already moving toward greater coordination inside government. The strategy’s “One Government Approach” brings civil and defense space policy together, with the stated aim of aligning priorities, procurement and engagement with industry.

That strategy also places more weight on government as a customer. It calls for procurement to help develop UK capabilities and says the government will use its purchasing power to support companies with potential to scale, rather than relying primarily on grants.

For Elefteriu, however, the issue goes beyond procurement.

“The near total lack of this expertise in government is a major strategic constraint on UK space development,” he said.

Lee expressed skepticism toward claims that the UK government truly lacks strategic direction. As mostly a space services user, the UK first needs clarity on what space capabilities are viable and affordable, he said. Many in the sector seem to expect government to define and fund the market rather than innovating to shape it themselves – unlike other industries where companies build the commercial case. This used to be how UK space operated, aligning projects around defense needs and long‑term R&D, he said.

“For example, the UK Government does not tell Airbus what the aviation market will look like or which aircraft to build; Airbus determines the market and presents a commercial investment case to the government,” Lee said.

But with commercial markets still distant and anxiety over SpaceX’s dominance, parts of the industry have become reactive, seeking a government‑led “National Space Strategy” instead of driving the market forward, he said.

The unique focus on SpaceX’s Starlink can also detract from honestly evaluating the strategic resilience of an entire critical industry, Garson added.

That leaves a question running through the strategy’s new emphasis on nationally separable capabilities: how much of the capability can Britain build, operate and sustain itself, and where is partnership still the more practical route?

The answer is unlikely to be the same across every part of the space architecture. The strategy itself points toward a mix of national programs, NATO cooperation, ESA participation and commercial capacity, with greater emphasis on the areas it considers strategically important.

For Elefteriu, the civil and defense sides ultimately remain connected.

“Britain cannot become a leading space nation without a powerful national space programme,” he said.